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Redefining Director Liability in Duty of
Care Cases: The Delaware
Supreme Court Narrows Van Gorkom.
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Delaware Supreme Court has long held that once plaintiff
shareholders demonstrate that defendant corporate directors have breached any
of their fiduciary duties2 in approving a transaction, the business judgment rule
is rebutted and the directors bear the burden of showing that the merger was
entirely fair to the shareholders.3
In Technicolor II, the Delaware Supreme Court examined the propriety
of a summary judgment order in favor of corporate directors when plaintiff
shareholders were unable to demonstrate that they had suffered actual damages
resulting from the directors' breach of their duty of care. The court stated that
even if, at the pleadings stage of trial, it is clear that the plaintiff shareholder
will not be able to demonstrate actual damages, summary judgment is not
appropriate; and that corporate directors still must demonstrate entire fairness
to escape liability.4
Although the court declared that the directors were not entitled to
summary judgment in Technicolor II, it held in Technicolor III that the
directors were not liable for any damages since the directors demonstrated that
1. 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995). [hereinafter Technicolor 111].
2. The are two basic fiduciary duties: the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.
The duty of loyalty states that directors must give the interest of the shareholders
primary consideration when deliberating on corporate policy. The duty of care
requires that the directors adequately inform themselves before deciding on corporate
issues. See LEWIS D. SOLOMON & ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONs §20.1 (1994).
3. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). The business judgment
rule creates a presumption that the business decisions of corporate directors are made
in compliance with their fiduciary duties and therefore not reviewable by a court. See
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (explaining that under Delaware
law, unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the directors were 'grossly' negligent in
approving a challenged transaction, the directors business decision will not be reviewed
by a court); cf Bold v. Simpson, 802 F.2d 314, 319-20 (8th Cir. 1984). (holding that
under Missouri law, the degree of care required on the part of corporate fiduciaries is
that which an ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances would have
exercised).
4. TechnicolorIff, 663 A.2d at 1162.
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the merger was entirely fair to the shareholders. 5 This Note suggests that the
Delaware Supreme Court decision in Technicolor III will render its
controversial decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom6 largely irrelevant.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
MacAndrews Forbes Group (MAF) entered into negotiations with
Technicolor Corporation to purchase Technicolor in the summer of 1982.1
Technicolor's chairperson, Ronald Perelman, and MAF's chairperson, Morton
Kamerman, negotiated the details of the merger from September 10, 1982
until October 27, 1982.8
Under the agreement, MAF would first offer $23 per share for
Technicolor's stock and then initiate a second step merger in which it would
convert Technicolor's remaining outstanding shares to $23 per share in cash.'
Technicolor's board of directors approved the merger in a meeting on October
29, 1982.10
MAF had acquired approximately 83% of Technicolor's stock by
December 3, 1982 and closed the original tender offering." Technicolor's
shareholders approved the merger agreement on January 24, 1983.2 MAF
implemented the second step merger after shareholder approval and all of
Technicolor's remaining outstanding shares were converted into $23 per share
in cash.' 3
Cinerama owned 201,000 shares of Technicolor's common stock.'4
Cinerama refused to tender its shares in MAF's original tender offering. 5
Cinerama also dissented from the second step merger and filed a petition for
an appraisal of the value of its shares pursuant to Delaware Code Annotated,
5. Id. at 1180.
6. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
7. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 352 (Del. 1993) [hereinafter
Technicolorll]. Technicolor's stock had experienced wide fluctuations in price in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. Technicolor's stock traded in the $8 to $10 price range
during the late 1970s. The stock peaked in value at $28.50 per share in April 1981.
However, when MAF began negotiations in the summer of 1982, Technicolor's shares
were trading in the $9 to $10 price range. Id. at 351 n.5.
8. Technicolor I1, 634 A.2d at 353-56.
9. Id. at 356.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 357.
12. Id. at 358.
13. Id.
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title 8, section 262.16 Cinerama uncovered evidence while conducting
discovery in the appraisal proceeding that caused it to believe that
Technicolor's board had breached its fiduciary duties in approving the merger
with MAF.'7 As a result of these findings, Cinerama filed a personal
liability action against Technicolor's directors.' Cinerama contended that
the true value of its Technicolor stock at the time of the merger was
$62.75." Cinerama also asserted that it should be awarded rescissory
damages due to the board's alleged breach of their fiduciary duties in
approving the merger.2"
The Chancellor first appraised the value of Technicolor's common stock
at $21.60 per share, approximately $2.00 below the merger price.2' The
Chancellor also found that the board had breached its duty of care by failing
to adequately inform themselves of the true value of Technicolor's stock.22
However, the Chancellor maintained that the board had not breached its duty
of loyalty.' The Chancellor then declared that in cases involving duty of
16. Id. Under Delaware law, only a majority of shareholders of a corporation
need to approve a merger with another company. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 25 1(b)
(Michie Supp. 1994). However, a shareholder who does not vote in favor of the
merger may dissent from the merger and file a petition in the Court of Chancery to
have its stock appraised. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 262(a) (Michie Supp. 1994). If
the Chancellor finds that the price offered by the acquiring company was lower than
the appraised value, the dissenting shareholder will receive the difference between the
two values. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 262(i) (Michie Supp. 1991).
17. Technicolor 111, 663 A.2d at 1160. Cinerama discovered evidence that
Technicolor's board may have violated its duty of care by failing to adequately inform
itself of the intrinsic value of Technicolor's stock before approving the merger.
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor Inc., Civ. A. No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134, at *2 (Del.
Ch. June 24, 1991). [hereinafter Personal Liability Action]. Cinerama also uncovered
evidence that at least some of Technicolor's board members may have had a personal
interest in the success of the merger; and therefore, the board had breached its duty of
loyalty. Id.
18. Personal LiabilityAction, Civ. A. No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134 (Del. Ch. June
24, 1991). The Chancellor first ruled that Technicolor must elect between the
appraisal action or the personal liability action. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542
A.2d 1182, 1184 (Del. 1988) [hereinafter TechnicolorI]. However, the Delaware
Supreme Court reversed on an interlocutory appeal and held that Cinerama could
proceed with both claims at the same time. Id. at 1192.
19. Personal Liability Action, Civ. A. No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134, at *2.
20. Id. Rescissory damages are equitable in nature and are designed to put the
aggrieved party in the position it would have been in if the transaction had not
occurred. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3(b) (2d ed. 1993).
21. Technicolor11, 634 A.2d at 350.
22. Id.
23. Personal Liability Action, Civ. A. No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134, at *2.
1996]
3
Bacon: Bacon: Redefining Director Liability in Duty of Care Cases:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
care questions, the plaintiff is only entitled to recover actual financial harm.24
The Chancellor held that since it appraised the value of Technicolor's stock
below the merger price, Cinerama could not prove damages and dismissed the
case.
25
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery in
Technicolor II. The court held that once the plaintiff demonstrates that the
director defendants have breached any of their fiduciary duties, the business
judgement rule is rebutted.26 The burden then shifts to the defendant
directors to show that the transaction was entirely fair to the shareholders in
order to avoid liability.27 The court then remanded the case back to the
Court of Chancery to ascertain if the merger was entirely fair to Technicolor's
shareholders.28
The Chancellor on remand again declared that in cases involving
directors' breach of their duty of care, rescissory damages are never
appropriate.29 Therefore, plaintiffs can only recover the difference between
the fair value of the stock at the time of the merger and the merger price.3"
The Chancellor further held that since the merger was a product of fair dealing
and since the price was fair as determined by its appraisal of the stock in the
Personal Liability Action, the merger was entirely fair to the shareholders.3'
Cinerama appealed this ruling to the Delaware Supreme Court. 2 The
court reiterated its earlier holding in Technicolor II and declared that the
plaintiff need not show financial damages to rebut the business judgment
rule.33 The court stated that once the plaintiff has shown that the defendants
breached any one of their fiduciary duties, the defendants must show that the
transaction was entirely fair to avoid substantive liability.34
The Supreme Court, however, did affirm the Chancellor's ruling that the
merger was entirely fair to Technicolor's shareholders.35 The Supreme Court
held that since the Chancellor carefully considered both the procedural and
24. Id. at *3.
25. TechnicolorI1, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 373.
29. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1145 (Del. Ch. 1994).
30. Id. at 1150.
31. Id. at 1141.
32. Technicolorll, 663 A.2d 1156, 1161 (Del. 1995).
33. Id. at 1162-63.
34. Id
35. Id. at 1177-78.
[Vol. 61
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price aspects of the merger, his conclusion that the merger was fair to the
shareholders must be affirmed. 6
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Asserting Damages as a Pleading Requirement
The Delaware Supreme Court addressed the issue of what damages, if
any, plaintiff shareholders need to allege at the pleadings stage in In re Tri-
Star Pictures, Inc., Litigation.7 In Tri Star, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant directors had breached their duty of loyalty by failing to disclose all
relevant information regarding an impending merger with the parent
corporation.38 The Chancellor dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure
to state a claim.3 ' The Chancellor held that since the plaintiffs failed to
allege that they were financially damaged by the defendants' alleged
nondisclosure, their complaint did not state a cause of action.40
The Supreme Court reversed the Chancellor's dismissal of the plaintiffs'
claim.4' The court stated that once the plaintiff establishes that the
defendants have breached a fiduciary duty, the burden shifts to the defendant
to demonstrate that the transaction was entirely fair.42 Also, the court stated
the measure of damages under an entire fairness analysis is not limited to the
difference between the actual value of the stock and the merger price.s The
court further declared that if the defendants fail to establish that the merger
was entirely fair, the Chancellor may fashion any relief it feels is appropriate,
including, but not necessarily limited to, rescissory damages.44 The court
then held that, based on this logic, plaintiffs are not required to plead
individual financial harm in a complaint seeking damages as a result of
directors' self-dealing to survive a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment.45
36. Id. at 1179.
37. 634 A.2d 319 (Del. 1993).
38. Id. at 320.
39. Id. at 320-21.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 321.
42. Id. at 333.
43. Id
44. Id.
45. Id. at 334. It is interesting to note, however, that the court stated in footnote
18 that the plaintiffs in Tri-Star would have to produce evidence with respect to the
amount of actual damages they suffered if they hope to recover more than just nominal
damages. Id. at 334 n.18.
1996]
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B. Entire Fairness
The Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger held that the test for entire
fairness involves aspects of both fair dealing and fair price.46 The court in
Weinberger also stated that the analysis is not bifurcated between fair dealing
and fair price, but rather the issue must be examined as a whole.47 Factors
that the Chancellor must consider in determining whether the transaction was
the result of fair dealing include: (1) the timing of the transaction;
(2) whether the negotiations were conducted at arm's length, (3) whether the
agreement allowed the directors to seek other bidders; (4) the directors'
motivation in approving the transaction; and (5) whether the shareholders were
adequately informed of all material information before approving the
transaction.48
The Weinberger court also addressed the issue of what constitutes a "fair
price". In Weinberger, the plaintiff asserted that the merger price was not fair
since the true value of the corporation's stock was $5 per share higher than
the merger price.49  The plaintiff supported this allegation by offering
evidence of premiums paid over market price in ten other mergers of similar
corporations and a valuation of the company's stock based on a discounted
cash flow analysis." The directors countered the plaintiffs argument by
contending that the Chancellor was correct in determining that the merger
price was fair by utilizing the "Delaware block" method.5'
The Supreme Court declared that the "Delaware block" method was no
longer to be the exclusive method in estimating the true value of a
corporation's stock.52 The court stated that the Chancellor must consider any
valuation technique or method that is generally accepted in the financial
community when determining the true value of a corporation's stock.53 The
46. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 711-15.
49. Id. at 712.
50. Id. A discounted cash flow analysis estimates the value of a corporation's
stock by forecasting the expected future revenues of the corporations reduced to
present value. For an application of this method, see Wach v. Continental Hosts, Civ.
A. No. 7954, 1994 WL 525222, at *10 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1994).
51. Id. Prior to Weinberger, the Delaware block method was the exclusive
technique in estimating the true value of a corporation's stock. Under this method, the
Chancellor is required to determine certain elements of the corporation's value and
then assigns weights to those values. The resulting amounts are then added together
to determine the value per share of the corporation's stock. See New Castle Dept. of
Finance v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 669 A.2d 100, 103 (Del. 1995).
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court then held that the Chancellor needed to reconsider its determination that
the $21 per share merger price was fair since it only utilized the "Delaware
block" method in making that determination. 4 The court also asserted, in
dicta, that although shareholders' damages should normally be limited to the
difference between the merger price and the fair price, if the plaintiff is able
to demonstrate that the merger was a product of the directors' self-dealing or
overreaching, the Chancellor may award whatever damages it believes are
appropriate, including rescissory damages."5
The Delaware Supreme Court's exacting application of the entire fairness
test, prior to Technicolor III, is illustrated in Mills Acquisition Company v.
MacMillian.6 In MacMillian, the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed a
merger for entire fairness where the Board of Directors had failed to properly
exercise procedural oversight before approving a merger and allowed two self-
interested directors to manipulate the approval process.5 7 The court first
explained that the standard of review of a board's action under the entire
fairness analysis is so exacting that it is often outcome determinative. 8 The
court asserted that any identifiable breach of fiduciary duty by the directors
would preclude a finding that the merger was entirely fair.59 The court then
held that the defendant directors' failure to properly oversee the merger
"irremediably" tainted the transaction and conclusively demonstrated that the
merger was not entirely fair to the shareholders.'
C. Smith v. Van Gorkom
In its landmark opinion, Smith v. Van Gorkom,' the Delaware Supreme
Court addressed the relationship between the business judgment rule and entire
fairness analysis. In Van Gorkom, directors of the Trans Union Corporation
approved a merger with the Marmon Group whereby Marmon would purchase
Trans Union's shares for $55 per share.62 Two Trans Union shareholders
54. Id. at 713-14.
55. Id. at 714. See supra note 20 for discussion of rescissory damages.
56. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
57. Id. at 1279-81.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1280.
60. Id.
61. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See Jay P. Moran, Comment, Business Judgment
Rule or Relic: Cede v. Technicolor and the Continuing Metamorphosis of Director
Duty of Care, 45 EMORY L. J. 339, 359-60 (1996) (asserting that until Van Gorkom,
Delaware courts were unwilling to remove the business judgment presumption and
review transactions in duty of care cases).
62. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 870.
1996]
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brought suit against Trans Union's directors, alleging that they had been
grossly negligent, and thus had breached their duty of care by failing to
ascertain the true value of Trans Union's stock before approving the
merger. 3 The directors countered by arguing that their actions did not
constitute gross negligence since the merger price represented a substantial
premium over the current market price, $38 per share, of the stock at the time
of the merger.64
The Van Gorkom court rejected the directors' assertion and held that they
had breached their duty of care by failing to adequately inform themselves of
the intrinsic value of the Trans Union stock before approving the merger.6
The court declared that market price is not a surrogate of the true value of the
stock; and thus, the directors must perform some other valuation calculation
to fulfill their duty of care obligations owed to the shareholders.66
The court then analyzed whether it should remand the case back to the
Court of Chancery for an entire fairness review of the transaction. The court
concluded that remand on this issue was not necessary since the corporate
directors could not demonstrate that the transaction was entirely fair because
they violated their duty to disclose all material information to the
shareholders.67
The court concluded that there were four material facts that the directors
did not disclose. First, the directors failed to disclose that they had not
properly informed themselves of the fair value of the stock and over relied on
Trans Union chairperson's, Van Gorkom, in agreeing to the $55 per share
merger price. Second, the directors failed to disclose that the negotiations
were not conducted at ann's length, as evidenced by the fact that the $55 per
share merger price was derived by calculating the highest price that would
allow Marmon to finance the transaction via a leveraged buyout.69 Third, the
directors failed to disclose that they had not questioned Van Gorkom enough
63. Id. at 871.
64. Id. at 875.
65. Id. at 874.
66. Id. at 875-76. This was an unequivocal rejection of the efficient market
hypothesis which posits that the all relevant, public information regarding a corporation
is reflected in its stock price. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good
Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 1059 (1990).
67. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 890. Delaware has adopted a materiality test in
determining what information directors must divulge to shareholders. Under this test,
if the rational shareholder would deem the information material to its decision whether
to approve a transaction, the directors must disclose the information. See Rosenblat
v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985).
68. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 890-91.
69. Id. at 891-92.
[Vol. 61
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to uncover that negotiations were not conducted at an's length." Finally,
the board did not disclose that they failed to uncover that the corporation's
chief financial officer's, Romans's, report that the $55 per share merger price
was in the fair price range of the stock was the result of Van Gorkom's
instruction to Romans to justify a leveraged buyout.71
The court asserted that because the directors had breached their duty to
disclose all material information to the shareholders, the directors could not
demonstrate that the merger was entirely fair to the shareholders. 72 Thus, the
court remanded the case to the Court of Chancery with instructions to award
damages in the amount equal to the difference between the "fair price" of the
stock on the date the merger was ratified by the directors and the merger




The Chancery Court held that rescissory damages are never appropriate
in situations where directors have only breached their duty of care; and
therefore, a plaintiff must show actual financial harm to survive a directors'
motion for summary judgement.75  The Chancellor first stated that a
shareholder's action to seek monetary relief for directors' breach of their duty
of care is no different than any other claim of negligence.76 Thus, any claim
asserting a breach of the duty of care must be supported by an allegation of
actual financial harm to survive a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment.77
The Chancellor then analogized the fiduciary duties of trustees and
corporate directors." The Chancellor observed that, under the law of trusts,
a trustee is never held liable for rescissory damages when he merely failed to
exercise the proper care when administering the trust property.79  The
70. Id. at 892.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 893.
73. Id.
74. Id. See supra note 53 and accompanying text for the Weinberger Court's
analysis of fair price.
75. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1144 (Del. Ch. 1994).
76. Id. at 1136.
77. Id.
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Chancellor stated that for policy reasons, the court should give corporate
directors, as compared to trustees, more of an incentive to take risks.80 Thus,
the Chancellor asserted that corporate directors could not be liable for
rescissory damages when they merely breach their duty of care."1
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the Chancellor's position in both
Technicolor II and Technicolor HT1."2 The Delaware Supreme Court
emphasized that the business judgment rule is both a procedural guideline for
the litigants and a substantive rule of law. 3 The court elaborated on this
edict by declaring that, as a procedural guideline, the business judgment rule
places the initial burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that the directors
have breached a fiduciary duty.
8 4
The court next noted that, once the plaintiff rebuts the business judgment
rule presumption by demonstrating that the directors breached one of their
fiduciary duties, the burden shifts to the directors to show that the transaction
was entirely fair." The court then noted that, if the Chancellor does not find
the merger to be entirely fair, it may fashion any appropriate equitable or
monetary relief, including rescissory damages.8 6 The court declared that it
is at this point in the proceedings that the Chancellor should determine what
damages, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to.8 Thus, when seeking relief from
a directors' breach of any of their fiduciary duties, including the duty of care,
plaintiff shareholders do not need to plead actual damages to survive a motion
for dismissal or summary judgment.88
B. Entire Fairness
The court began its entire fairness analysis with the proclamation that the
function of entire fairness analysis is to determine how the board of directors
discharged all of its fiduciary duties in approving the merger.89 The
Delaware Supreme Court then addressed the fair dealing prong of the entire
80. Id. at 1148. This results because the trustee is essentially performing a
caretaker role while a corporate director is charged with the management of a
corporation, which inherently involves risk taking. See infra text accompanying note
126.
81. Cinerama Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1148 (Del. Ch. 1994).
82. Technicolor111, 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995).
83. Id. at 1161.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1166.
87. Id.
88. Id
89. Id. at 1172.
[Vol. 61
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fairness analysis.9" The court first observed that the negotiations between
Kamerman and MAF took place at arm's length, as evidenced by the fact that
Kamerman was able to induce MAF to raise its offer from $15 per share to
$23 per share.91 The court then commented that the structure of the
agreement seemed to be the product of fair dealing, since it gave Technicolor
the right to provide information to, and engage in, discussion with other
bidders.9' The court next remarked that the fact that all material information
was disclosed to the directors prior to their approval was additional evidence
that the agreement was the result of fair dealing.93
The court then examined the manner in which Technicolor's directors
approved the transaction. The court emphasized that the Chancellor must
identify specific deficiencies in the board's actual conduct in discharging its
duties to find that the transaction was not entirely fair.94 Therefore, the court
explained that, although the directors had been grossly negligent in not
conducting an adequate valuation study of the company, the degree of care
which the board exercised in approving the merger remains highly relevant in
an entire fairness analysis.9 Thus, the directors' consultation of two highly
regarded financial institutions and careful consideration whether to accept
MAF's offer or shop the company was evidence that the merger was entirely
fair to the shareholders.96
The court next analyzed whether the directors' approval had been the
result of manipulation or overreaching by a self-interested director. The court
stated that there was no persuasive evidence that any of the directors were
influenced by self-interest in negotiating and approving the merger.97 The
court next asserted that the evidence also indicated that only one director,
Sullivan, had a material conflict, and that no director dominated the approval
process.9" The court concluded that, on these facts, the evidence supported
the Court of Chancery's finding that the Technicolor's board approval was
untainted by conflict. 9
The court then declared that Cinerama's assertion-that Technicolor's
directors had not made full disclosure of all relevant information to the
shareholders before recommending approval of the merger-was without
90. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
91. Technicolor II, 663 A.2d at 1172.
92. Id. at 1173.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1174-75.
95. Id. at 1175.
96. Id.
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merit." ° The court stated that, although a finding that the directors made full
disclosure to the shareholders is not dispositive in an entire fairness analysis,
it has "persuasive substantive significance" for three reasons.' First, it
removes the case from the virtual per se rule of damages for breach of the
fiduciary duty of disclosure."2 Second, it bears directly upon how the
approval of the stockholders was obtained.0 3 Third, it places the case into
the category of a non-self-dealing transaction, so that price may be the
preponderant consideration outweighing other features of the merger."
The court then explored the price prong of the entire fairness
analysis.' 5 The court noted that MAF paid a 109% premium over the
market price of Technicolor.'0 6 The court also recognized that experts such
as Goldman Sachs indicated that the merger price of $23 per share was
fair. 7 The court finally observed that no rival bidder came forward, even
though the MAF transaction did not close for several months after it was
announced.' The court held that since Cinerama did not offer any credible
rebuttal evidence that the merger price was not fair, the above mentioned
factors demonstrated that the price was fair.09
The Supreme Court concluded by declaring that the directors need not
show that their actions were perfect in establishing that the transaction was
entirely fair to the shareholders."0 The court asserted that, although the
directors inadequately informed themselves in ascertaining the true value of
the corporation, the directors had met their burden of demonstrating that the
merger was entirely fair."' Thus, the court declared that the directors were







106. Id. This was the fourth highest premium paid over market price in
transactions involving comparably sized companies.
107. Technicolor-III, 663 A.2d at 1177.
108. Id.
109. Id.









A. Limiting the Application of Van Gorkom
Immediately following the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Van
Gorkom, there was a great deal of controversy over what its impact would be
on corporate law. Most commentators suggested that Van Gorkom would have
broad and disastrous effects upon corporate law."3 However, a significant
minority of commentators asserted that Van Gorkom did not mark a departure
from existing law and its application would essentially be limited to its
facts."' A careful reading of Technicolor III suggests that the latter view
has prevailed.
Technicolor II did certainly expand the potential for director liability by
holding that plaintiff shareholders do not need to plead actual financial harm
to rebut the business judgment rule presumption in duty of care cases." 5
However, in Technicolor III, the court significantly liberalized the application
of the entire fairness standard in reviewing a challenged merger as articulated
by the MacMillian court."6
In Technicolor III, the Delaware Supreme Court transformed the entire
fairness test from a test that searches for any identifiable breach of the
directors' breach of their fiduciary duties" 7 to one that requires the
Chancellor to identify specific board misconduct in approving the challenged
transaction."' Under Technicolor III, if the directors can demonstrate that
they properly oversaw the execution and approval of the challenged
transaction, it becomes the burden of the shareholders to proffer some
evidence that the transaction was not entirely fair." 9 Thus, Technicolor III
suggests that, in duty of care cases, the entire fairness test is to be used as a
subterfuge in determining whether the directors gave adequate consideration
113. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union
Case, 41 Bus. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985).
114. See Barry F. Schwartz & James G. Wiles, Trans Union: Neither "New" Law
nor "Bad" Law, 10 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 429, 430-31 (1985).
115. This is clearly an expansion of the Weinberger court's assertion in dicta that
in duty of care cases, shareholder damages are limited to actual financial harm. See
supra note 55 and accompanying text. See also Moran, supra note 61, at 359-60
(arguing that TechnicolorlI significantly expands the potential for director liability but
failing to consider the impact of the liberalized entire fairness review given in
Technicolor III).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
117. See supra text accompanying note 59.
118. See supra text accompanying note 94.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 98, 100, 103, and 112.
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to the terms of the merger before approving it. This marks a significant
liberalization of the Delaware courts' application of the entire fairness test as
illustrated in MacMillian.
This reformulation of the entire fairness standard in Technicolor III
suggests the Van Gorkom decision will have only narrow application in the
future. Specifically, Technicolor III contemplates that in duty of care cases,
directors will only be held liable for damages in cases, such as Van
Gorkom2° and MacMillian, where the directors have failed to exercise
procedural oversight of the challenged transaction and allowed a self-interested
director to manipulate the approval process.
B. Reducing Transaction Costs
The Technicolor IiI court's narrowing of director liability in duty of care
cases will promote efficiency since it lowers the transaction costs of
conducting corporate business. A judicial rule imposing director liability will
be efficient if it mimics the rule the parties would have reached if they had
explicitly determined the rule by contract.' Such a rule is efficient since
it eliminates the necessity for the parties to engage in costly negotiations and
thus reduces the transaction costs of conducting corporate business.' 22 The
Technicolor II1 rule of director liability creates such a rule by balancing the
shareholders' interest in providing an incentive to the directors to undertake
risky transactions with their need for protection against directors' potential
abuse of corporate power.
First, the Technicolor III rule gives shareholders protection against
possible directors' abuse in exercising their managerial responsibilities. Under
Technicolor III's rule of director liability, shareholders will be able to collect
damages, possibly even rescissory damages, from directors if the directors
shirk their managerial responsibility to oversee the approval of a transaction
and simply allow a self-interested director to manipulate the approval process.
Thus, Technicolor III's rule of director liability gives directors an incentive
to consider whether to approve a transaction independent from any influence
of a self interested director."
120. Although the Van Gorkom court held that the merger was not entirely fair
since the directors failed to disclose all material information to the shareholders, that
material information was related to the fact that the directors allowed Van Gorkom to
manipulate the approval process. See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
121. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLuM. L. REv. 1416, 1444-46 (1989).
122. See id.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
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Second, the Technicolor III rule gives corporate directors the incentive
to engage in appropriate levels of risk taking. A basic axiom of finance is that
the riskier the transaction, the greater the possibility for large returns or
losses.'24 Stock holders are typically risk seeking, since they can diversify
away their risk of a loss by one of their holdings if their portfolio is properly
diversified. " Directors, conversely, are typically risk averse, since a
significant loss by the corporation can cause serious damage to a director's
managerial reputation and thus decrease the possibilities for future
employment.'26 Technicolor III ameliorates this divergence between
shareholder interest and director interest by assuring directors that they will
not be liable in approving a risky transaction that results in losses, provided
they performed their managerial duties and properly oversaw the approval of
the transaction.
VI. CONCLUSION
As one commentator suggested, Van Gorkom may have been one of the
worst decisions in corporate law history. 27  However, the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision in Technicolor II makes it clear than Van Gorkom
will essentially be limited to its facts by converting the traditionally exacting
entire fairness test into a subterfuge for determining whether the directors
exercised proper oversight in approving a transaction. This reformulation of
the entire fairness test closely resembles the rule of liability shareholders and
directors would bargain for if they were to explicitly contract the terms of
their relationship. Thus, the Technicolor II decision will reduce the
transaction costs of conducting corporate business.
BRYAN C. BACON
124. See Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A
Contractual Perspective, 18 J. CoRP. L. 185, 210 (1993).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Fischel, supra note 113, at 1455.
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